I n t r o d u c t i o n
, Dreze(1974 ), Ekernand Wilson(1974 , Radner(1974) , GrossmanandHaaart(1979) , DeMarzo(1993) , KelseyandMilne(1996 ),andBonnisseauannndLchiri(2003 .Sommmeoftheseee objectiveeesareusefultounderstandtheeciecyofequilibriawhenarketsar incomplte;see, forexample, Diamond(1967) , Stiglitz (1982) , Drrreeeze(1985) , annndddGeaaannnakoplos, Magill, Quinzii,andDreze(1990) .Othersa usefulto u e r s t d r m o b j e c t i v e s c o n s i s t e e e n t controlorsomecollectivechoicerul;see, forexample, DeMrzo(1993) , Kesey andMilne (1996) , CresssandTvede(2001 ),andTvedeandCres(2005 . Formalconnectionbetweenthesetwotypesofooobjectiveshavenotbeen exploredinmuchdetail.Forexample,itisunclearifobjectivessuchasthose by Dreze(1974 ),orGrossmanandHart(1979 arecnsistentwithsomeform ofshareholdercontrol,orifshareholdercontrolsuchasthatproposedby
De---Marzo(1993)isconsistentwithaDreze-typeruleee.Suchconnectionssscanhelp understandwhenrmobjectiveswithdesirableciencypropertiearecon sistentwithadecentralizedprocessofshareholdercontrol.
Usingaparticularprocessof expost shareholdercontrol,thispaperprovidesajusticationfortheconsistencyofvaluemaximization(includingversionsproposedby DrezeandGrossmanaaandHart)withshareholdercontrol. Itisshownthhhat expost , v a l u e m a x i m i z t i o n i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h s h a r e preferenceswenmarketsareincompleteandshareholdersarechangingover time,inthesensethatalongtheequilibriumpath,ineverytimeperiodand stateoftheworld,itisindividuallyrationalforeaaachshareholdertoapproveee a v a l u e -m a x i m i z i n n n g p p p r o d u c t i o n p l a n . M o r e g e n e r l l y , usingideasfromCor thhheory,itisshowthatalongtheequilibriumpath,everycoalitionofarm's s a r e h o l d e r s i n t h a t e r i o d a n d d d s t a t e a p p r o v e s a v a l u e ppplan. 1 Intuitively,ifshareholersareseparatefrommanageeerialcontrol,and rrresentshareholdersdonotknowtheidentityof futuresharholdersandcannotcrediblyaectfutureeeplans,thenitisinallshareholders'bestinterestthat m m a n a g e r s m a x i m i z r m v a l u e . 2 ThetechnicalintuitionforthisresultissimilaaartooothafortheresultforArrow-Debreu econommmies;avalue-maximizingproductionplanprvidesamaximalextensionofevery ccconnnsuer-shareholder'sbudgetsetineachpeeeriodndstateinwhichhhaconsumer-shareholdeeerrr a a e c t p r o d u c t i o n n n c h h h o i c e s , a n d t h e r e f o r suchabudgetset,aoterproductionplancannotimproveuponthisoutcome.
Forsometypesofeconomies,suchasprivateownershipeconomieswith aaannnonymousstockmarkettradeovertime(sochangingshareholdersovertime), d w i t h o w n e r s h i p s e p a r a t e f r o m m a n a g e m e n t , a c r e d i b l e e v changeofproductionplans,andofmanagemennnt,ismorenatural expost , a n d noootnecessarilyexante . F o r e x a m p l e , w i t h a n o o o y m o u s s t o c k m a r k e t t r a time,rmshareholderscannotbeassumedtknowidentitiesofothersharh l d e r s , exante . Atmost,shareholdersinaparticularperiodcanbeassumed, expost , t o k n o w i d e n t i t i e s o f o t h e r s h a r e h o l d e r s i n t h a t p e r i o d , p e r h shareholdeeermeetingforthatpeeeriod. Moreover,rmsharehoooldersinaparticulaaarperiodcanaectrmdcisionsinthatperrriod,(byvtingtoremove mangemnt,ifnecessary,)andtheycaaannnblockapoductionplaninconsistent withtheirpreferencesevenifsuchapl isprrreferredbydierentshareholders inadierentperiod. Therefore,shareholdesinaparticularpeeeriodcannot crediblyassumethatarmmanagerisabletoooimplementafuturproduction planconsistentwithexistingshareholderpreferences.
Shareholderscan,at most,crediblyaectthechoiceofaproductinplanatanodeatwhichtttheyyy aaarermsharrreholders. Consequuuently,foraparticularproductionplantosaisf consistentrmobjective,schaplanshouldsuuurviveshareholderblocking ineverypeiod(moregenerally,everynode).
S c h a p r o c e s s i s f o r m a l i z e d below.
3 Itisnoteworthythatthispaperdoesnotconsidertheproblemofeciency ofeeequilibriumallocationswhenmmmarketttsareincomplete. Asiswell-known, wwwhnmmmarketsareincomplete,copetiiveequilibriaandstockmarketequilibriaightfaaailtobeParetoecient (Hart(1975) , Stiglitz(1982) ).
Moreover, ithparticulrdenitionsofconstrainedeciency,competitiveequilibriacaaan beconstrainedParetoecient (Diamond(1967) , Grossman(1977) ),canfil tobeconstrainedParetoecient (Dierker,Dierker,andGrodal(2002) ),and cangenericallyfailtobeconstrainedParetoecient(GeeeanakoplosandPolemmmarchakis(1986), Geanakoplos,Magill,Quinzii,andDrze(1990) ).
Moreooover,thispaperdoesnoteliiiminatetheproblemof ex-ante disagreeeeentamngrmshareholdersinequlibrium.
Theanalysisheeerecanbeviewd asprovidingan ex-post stabilitycriterrrion(intermsofrobustnsstoooshareeeholder coalitions)fororganizingproductiveesourcesindecentralizedecnomiswith 3 Noticethatan expost evaluatiiionmaynotbeappropriateinallcases.Forexample,if a c o l l e c t i o n o f e n t r e p r e n e u r s k n o w e a c h o t h e r a n d r u n a r m t h e m s s s e l v e s , ( p e r h a p proprietorshiporprivatepartneeershp,)orifthereisacollectionofhareholderswhoareentrenchedcorporateiiinsiders,andimportttantly,arecrediblycommittedtoremainshareholders ooovertime(assometmesconsidredinheliteratureoncorporategovernanceaaandregulation f n a n c i a l m a r k e t s ) , t h e n a n o n y m i t y o f f u t u r e s h a r e h o l d e r s m a y n o t b e m i n an exante evaluationisareasonableassumption. 
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6 Thenotionsofindierence( ∼ i ) a n d s t r i c t p r e f e r e n c e ( i ) a r e t h e u s u a l o n e s . 
r e e e c e i v e s a s h a r e o f r m p o t s f o r p e r i ô t. T o a i d d d i n t e r p r e t t i o n , ttthhhiscanbeviwedasstttockmarkettradeattheeeendofaperio.Atthebeginningofeachperiodt, h e r e i s a s h a r e h o l d e r m e t i n g o f e x i s t
aaatis,shareholderswhoboughtrmsharesattheendofperiodt − 1.Thee shhhreholdersaaaretermedperiodt shareholders.Atthismeeting,managersof rmĵ prrresentperiodt shareholderstheproductionresultsforperiodt−1,and t e i r c u r e n t n d f u t u r e p r o d u c t i o n p l a n , d e n o t e d ( y^j)
T t=t . I n t u i t i v e l y , a s u b s e t ofperiodt shareholdersprefersafeasibleproductionplan y^^ĵ t toproooduction plan y^^ĵ t , i f t h e y c a n r e -d i s t r i b u t e e e a m o n g t h e m s e l v e s t h e i r r r p p p e e e r r r i o t endwments andproductionplan y^^ĵ t togetnwconsumptionplansfo it sothatwhen comparedtttotheconsumptionplaneachcouldhaveachievedwithherperiodt endowmenandheeershareofprotsfromproductionplan y^^ĵ t , n o s h a r e h o l d e r i n thissubsetismadworseowithhernewconsumptionplan,someshareholdeeer inthissubseeetismadestrictlybettero,andshareholdersnotinthissubst areunaectd.
10 Forasubsetofshareholderstoapproveproductionplan y^^ĵ t , shareholder i inperiodt, s t a t eŝ, t h e n consumer-shareholder i prefers
t s otherwise,and consumer-shareholder i strictlyprefers
thepreferenceofconsumer-sharrreeeholder i, a n d l e t x i beaconsumptionplanfor consumer-shareholder i. T h e p f e r e n c e i t (s) i s w e a k l y m o n o t o n e i n p e r i o d t, stattte s, i f f o r e v e r y c o n s u m p t i o n p l a n x i , hereisinthefamiliartraditionofcoalitionre-distributionsthatarefeasiblewithcoalition eeendowmentswithoutadditionalcooonstraintttsregarrrdingbudgetsets.Ofcourse,ineithercase, a v a l u e -m a a a x i m i z i n g p l a n i s a p p p p r p r i a a a t e l y a o r d a b l e i n e q u i l i b r i u xtentabudgetconstraiiintimosesddiionaleeestrictionsoncandidateplansthatmigttt dominatevalue-maxiiimzingplan,theresulthercanbeviewedasastrongerresultintha itholdswithaaapotentallllygreateeernumberofcandidateproductionplans. 11 Noticethttheresutsprrresentedheredonotdependontheparticulartimingofshareeeholdermeeeetingsannndstocktadmeeentionedabove.ForstockmarkettradeasinRadddnr (1972) ,thonnnlyiterpretiverequirmentwouldbethatasharehoooldermeetingishelat leastaninstatbefooorestocktrade,sothatshhhaaareholderswhoaretreceiveeeprotsinape---riodaretheonesvtinnngonrmplansforttperiod.Conditionalonthisrequirement, shareholdermeeeetingadstocktttradecanbeeeheldatanytimeduringapriod.Inpartic ular,thisapplisforanelemenarytimepriod,whichisalsoviewedasanode.Similar interpretationsnaturallyholdforcum-dividendstocktrading.
Productionpreeeferencesofsubsetsofshareholdersareformalizedasfollows. Let y = (y j ) J j=1 b a p r o d u c t i o n p p p r o l e , a n d ( 
b e a r m j coooalitioninperiodt, s t a t eŝ, l e t y^^ĵ t (ŝ) b e a productionplanforrmĵ inperidt, s t a t eŝ, a n d d e n e C^^ĵ t (ŝ) prefers y^^ĵ t (ŝ) to y^^ĵ t (ŝ),if
• theproductionplan y^j formedbysetting y^j t (s) = y^^ĵ t (ŝ) i ft =t, a n d s =ŝ, a n d y^j t (s) = y^j t (s) o t h e r w i s e , i s f e a s i b l e , ( t h a t i s , y^j ∈ Y^j,) 12 and
(ŝ) i n p e r i o d t, s t a t e e eŝ suchttthattheproductionprole( y
(ŝ) o t h e r w i s e , a n d t h e c o n s u m p t i o n p r o l e (
ŝ) o t h e r w i s e , togetherformanallocationinperiodt, s t a t eŝ, ( t h a t i s ,
Therstconditionensuresthatacannndidateforapreferredproductionplanis feasible,thesecondconditionensuresthatiftheinitialproductionandconsumptionprolesformanallocatttioinagivenperiodandstate,thenthe candidateproductionandconsumptionprolesremainanallocationinthat periodandstate,andtherefore,hecandidateconsumptionandproduction 12 Noticethatfeeeasibilityofproductionplaaannnsrestrictsthetypesofalternativeproductions ppplansthatcanbconsideeeredinaperioddstate.Forgoodproduuucccedperiodically,say,,, t-shirtsproducedinagivnperiod,(oranynumberofothergoods,shasboxesofcereal airsofjeans,sandwiches,pizzas,papertttowels,DVDplayers,airconditioners,tires,cars computeeers,trucks,periodiclaborserrrvices,bricks,lightbulbs,andsoooon,)thishasanatural interpretationofusingadierentpoducionplanforagivenperidandstate.(Thiscan beviewdaaasatypeofseparabilityinproductionovertime.) Buttheremaybesometypes ooofplansthtcaaannnnotbechaaangedmuchoveroneperiod,say,producinglargeships,orrrplanes, r l a r g e r o c k e t s . I n s u c h c s e e e s , o n c e a p r o d u c t i o n p l a n h a s b e e n c o o o m m i s s i o n e d , t h notbeverymyalternativproductionplansthatarefeasiblefragivenperiod. Lemma. Let (p, q) beapricesystem,
, and Theorem. Let (p, q) beapricesystem, δ beadiscountratesystem, expost evalu t i o n i s a n o d e -w i s e e v a l u a t i o n , a n d a s m a r k e t s t a n o d e a r complete,ideassimilartothoseusedinWalrasianeconomiesareappiedata node.
Proof. T o p r o v e t h e r s t s t a t e m e n t , s u p p o s e i t s h y p o t h e s i s i s
14 Therefore,theresultheeeredependsonthejusticaaationofanode-wissse , s h a r e h o l d e r s g i v e n b y t h e s h a r e h o l d i n g e n o w m e n t u n n n a n i m approve y j 1 (s) a s a p r o d u c t i o n p l a n i n p e r i o d 1 , s t a t e s, a n d w h e p r e s e n t e d with( y j t ) T t=2 , s h a r e h o l d e r s i n p e r i o d 2 , s t a t e s unanimoussslyapprovey j 2 (s) a s a ppprrroductionplaninperiod2,states, a n d c o n t i n u i n g i n a i m i l a r m a n n e r , w h e n esentedwith( y 
